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Background: Vascular surgical care has changed dramatically in recent years with little knowledge 
of the impact of system failures on patient safety.  The primary aim of this multicentre, observational 
study was to define the landscape of surgical system failures, errors and inefficiency (collectively 
termed failures) in aortic surgery.  Secondary aims were to investigate determinants of these failures 
and their relationship with patient outcomes. 
Methods: Twenty vascular teams at ten English hospitals trained in structured, self-reporting of 
intraoperative failures (phase I).  Failures occurring in open and endovascular aortic procedures were 
reported in phase II. Failure details (category, delay, consequence), demographic information (patient, 
procedure, team experience) and outcomes were reported.   
 
   
Results:  There were strong correlations between the trainer and teams for the number and type of 
failures recorded during 88 procedures in phase I.  In 185 aortic procedures, teams reported a median 
of 3 (i.q.r.  2–6) failures per procedure. Most frequent failures related to equipment (unavailability, 
failure, configuration, desterilization).  Most major failures related to communication.  Fourteen 
failures directly harmed 12 patients.   Significant predictors of an increased failure rate were: 
endovascular compared with open repair (incidence rate ratio (IRR) for open repair 0.71, 95 per cent 
c.i. 0.57 to 0.88; P = 0.002), thoracic aneurysms compared with other aortic pathologies (IRR 2.07, 
1.39 to 3.08; P < 0.001) and unfamiliarity with equipment (IRR 1.52, 1.20 to 1.91; P < 0.001).  Major 
failure total was associated with reoperation (P = 0.011), major complications (P = 0.029) and death 
(P = 0.027). 
Conclusion: Failure in aortic procedures is frequently caused by issues with team-working and 
equipment, and is associated with patient harm.  Multidisciplinary team training, effective use of 
technology and new-device accreditation may improve patient outcomes. 
 
+A: Introduction 
It is well known that a significant number of patients come to harm while in hospital1.  The highest 
rate of adverse events is in patients undergoing surgical intervention, most notably in those 
undergoing a major vascular procedure2.  
Medicine used to be simple, ineffective and relatively safe, whereas it is now complex, 
effective and potentially dangerous3.  This is certainly true for major vascular surgery. Patient and 
technical factors are obvious determinants of outcome, but current thinking emphasizes the role of 
wider aspects of the surgical system in patient safety1.  The high-risk nature of vascular procedures in 
elderly patients with complex co-morbidities, and the importance of technical expertise are well 
recognized in vascular surgery.  Investigation of wider system factors is now warranted, particularly 
as vascular surgery has undergone significant changes in recent years, with centralization of services 
in the UK and the rapid development of minimally invasive (endovascular) technologies.  These novel 
strategies for vascular patients have undoubtedly reduced major morbidity and mortality but, to 
achieve consistently optimal results, continuous emphasis must be placed on optimizing patient 
   
safety.  Single-centre exploratory studies4,5 in arterial surgery identified failures related to team 
communication, surgical equipment and planning, but whether these failures occur at vascular centres 
throughout the country and, most importantly, their impact on patient outcomes remain unknown.  
The mechanisms of harm, the determinants of increased failure rates and the impact of system failures 
on patient outcomes are important information to plan strategies for safety improvement.   
The LEAP (Landscape of Error in Aortic Procedures) study is a multicentre, collaborative 
effort to explore patient safety in vascular surgery.  The primary aim of the LEAP study was to define 
the landscape of surgical system failure, error and inefficiency in open and endovascular aortic 
surgery.  Secondary aims were to investigate determinants of failure, and the relationship between 
intraoperative failure and patient outcomes. 
+A: Methods 
Phase I was a training phase to train teams and establish the reliability of a self-reporting method.  In 
phase II, teams self-reported failures occurring in aortic procedures, the impact of these failures, and 
patient outcomes. Full research ethics committee (12-LO-0710) and local approvals from the 
participating organizations were obtained.  
+B: Setting and participants 
Participating operating teams were recruited in ten hospitals in England (September 2012 to July 
2014).  Operating teams consisted of a consultant vascular surgeon, anaesthetists, nurses and support 
staff, as well as radiology staff (radiologist and/or radiographer) for many procedures; team 
composition was not the same for all procedures owing to shift patterns and rotation of staff.  For the 
training phase, all adult patients on participating vascular consultants’ operating lists were eligible for 
inclusion in phase 1.  However, in phase 2, only adult patients undergoing elective or urgent aortic 
surgery for aneurysm or aorto-occlusive disease were included.  Staff and patients provided written, 
informed consent to participate.   
+B: Materials 
Twenty consultant vascular surgeons and their operating teams were trained by a single observer (a 
senior vascular nurse practitioner) to report intraoperative surgical system failures, errors and 
inefficiencies using a validated and structured, team-based approach.  The Imperial College error 
   
capture record (ICECAP) is a paper-based tool consisting of several prompts read aloud to structure 
reporting of failures; its development and validation is described in full elsewhere5.  Primary failure 
categories are: equipment, communication, procedure-independent pressures (distractions, team 
member absence, external pressures), technical, safety awareness and patient-related.  Each of the 
primary categories has a number of secondary fields.  For a failure to be recorded on ICECAP, the 
team had to come to a consensus on whether or not a failure had occurred, and on the category of 
failure.  
+B: Definitions 
A failure was as any event that prevented the procedure from progressing in an ideal manner.  This 
broad definition was a deliberate attempt to capture all relevant safety events.  The term failure 
encompasses different types: failures in the surgical system (system factors), human errors and 
sources of inefficiency.  Failures were to be reported if they occurred between the patient being 
transferred into the operating theatre and final closure of the wound.   
Major and minor failures were defined by their immediate consequences during surgery.  
Failures that caused intraoperative delay of more than 15 min, caused harm, or placed the patient at 
significant risk of harm were referred to as major failures.  Harm was defined as injury to the patient 
evidenced by a physiological response to the injury (such as cardiovascular instability), or by the need 
for further invasive intervention; harm may have occurred during the operation without further 
sequelae (lasting disability).   
+B: Procedure and data collection 
+C: Phase I 
Shift patterns and staff rotation meant that the operating team composition was inconsistent; the 
trainer therefore undertook multiple visits to each site to capture as many operating staff as possible.   
The trainer attended a median of 5 (range 4–6) procedures with each consultant vascular surgeon and 
team, to provide training to all key participating staff.  At the beginning of the operating list, the 
trainer outlined the aims of the study, important definitions and protocol to the operating team.  
During the procedure, the trainer recorded failures that occurred.  At the end of the first procedure 
with the trainer present, the trainer led the team through the ICECAP debrief and completion of the 
   
written ICECAP record.  Thereafter, a member of the team led the debrief, which took place in the 
same structured manner on each occasion.  The trainer highlighted failures that she recorded to help 
teams to develop an understanding of the types of failure that should be reported.  The trainer 
encouraged reflection and discussion between team members to enable a consensus to be reached 
regarding failures to be documented on the ICECAP record. 
+C: Phase II 
In the main study phase, each site aimed to collect data independently during 20 consecutive aortic 
procedures.  Sites were asked to complete an aortic procedure log, indicating any interventions that 
were not recruited, with reasons.  For each intervention, patient, procedure and team demographic 
data were collected, and the primary operator indicated whether he or she was unfamiliar with any of 
the equipment used. Details of each failure were recorded, including whether or not the patient was 
harmed, any corrective measures necessary to prevent harm, and the delay caused by the failure.  
Postoperative complications were recorded for 30 days or until hospital discharge, whichever was 
sooner.  
+B: Handling of data 
Case report forms were collated and information entered into a purpose-built database at the lead site.  
All failures were reviewed independently by two experienced clinical assessors, and categorized as 
major or minor, or excluded if they did not meet the study definition.  Two independent assessors 
graded postoperative complications using the Clavien–Dindo system6.  Grades III, IV and V are 
referred to as major complications.   
+B: Statistical analysis 
Agreement between assessors was assessed by means of Cohen’s κ.  Univariable and multivariable 
Poisson regression analysis was used to compare failure rates (failures per hour) for different patient, 
procedure and team groups, and the clustering effect resulting from potential variability in reporting 
styles at the hospital-site level was taken into account by using cluster robust standard errors.  The 
variables included in the regression were: age, sex, ASA fitness grade, aortic pathology, procedure 
type (open surgical or endovascular), team member experience based on the number of similar 
operations performed (over 50 versus fewer than 6 similar procedures), and familiarity with 
   
equipment.  The Wilcoxon rank-sum test was used to test for differences in the number of 
intraoperative failures and patient outcomes.  All reported P values are two-sided.  P < 0.050 was 
deemed to indicate statistical significance.  Data were analysed in Stata® version 12 (StataCorp, 
College Station, Texas, USA) by an independent statistician.   
+A: Results 
+B: Phase I 
Eighty-eight procedures were included in phase I.  The failure profiles reported by the trainer and in 
self-report by operating teams are summarized in Fig. 1.  The correlation between the trainer and 
operating teams for the number of failures identified per procedure was good (Spearman’s ρ = 0.766, 
P < 0.001) and operating teams identified 95 per cent of major failures (18 of 19), indicating that they 
were able to follow study procedures and assess failure rates reliably.  
+B: Phase II 
Following a period of training, 20 consultant vascular surgeons and their operating teams reported 
failures occurring in 185 elective aortic procedures.  Only two urgent patients were recruited and were 
therefore excluded from analyses; only planned procedures were included. The aortic procedure log 
was completed poorly and was therefore unhelpful.  Teams performing open surgical procedures 
consisted of the following core members: consultant vascular surgeon, consultant anaesthetist, scrub 
nurse and support staff.  For endovascular interventions, core team members additionally included a 
consultant radiologist and a radiographer, as is common practice in the UK.  All procedures started 
during daytime hours, although 16.2 per cent (30 of 185) finished after 17.00 hours. Patient, 
pathology and procedure characteristics are provided in Table 1. 
+B: Failure characteristics 
The operating teams recalled 930 failure events in total.  Independent assessment excluded 131 events 
that did not meet the study definition for the following reasons: event did not occur during surgery 
(43; such as lack of intensive care bed delayed start of procedure); likely anticipated patient-related 
issue (72; for example, tortuous iliac arteries identified on preoperative imaging); and other (16).  Of 
799 failures, operating teams identified a median of 3 (i.q.r. 2–6, range 0–23) per procedure. The 
   
median failure rate was 1.0 (i.q.r. 0.6–2.0, range 0–6 per h. There was a significant correlation 
between the number of failures per procedure and the duration of operation (Spearman’s ρ = 0.300, P 
< 0.001).  
The details of failures are shown in Fig. 2.  Overall, most frequent failures related to 
equipment (33.9 per cent), usually non-availability, ranging from minor issues, such as non-
availability of the desired sheath size, to major failures, for example ‘unavailability of the custom-
made thoracic stent graft, which was believed to be on site but was found not to be available after 
spinal drain insertion and general anaesthesia’. The primary operator reported unfamiliarity with 
equipment in 18 procedures (open 1, endovascular 17), of which unfamiliarity with stent-graft devices 
was reported in 11.  Procedure-independent pressures (interruptions and distractions, team member 
absence and external pressures) were also common (21.7 per cent of all failures). 
+B: Consequences of failure  
The consequences of failure were varied. Nearly two-thirds of failures (62.9 per cent) caused 
intraoperative delays, and 9.8 per cent of failures led to significant delays (more than 15 min during 
the operation).  In total, intraoperative delays accounted for more than 90 h of unproductive operating 
time over the 185 procedures.  More than one-third of failures (33.8 per cent) necessitated corrective 
action by the operating teams. 
Some 93 (11.6 per cent) of 799 failures were classified as major failures.  Most frequent 
major failures were unanticipated problems related to the patient’s anatomy or physiology (33 per 
cent). Patient-related failures are therefore an important source of unanticipated delay (while the 
operating team address the problem), and could indicate failures in preoperative planning or 
preparation.  Non-patient-related failures were most commonly communication failures (22 per cent 
of major failures), for example ‘radiology staff not informed of start time-delay in starting 
endovascular phase (45 min) while patient under general anaesthesia’.  Of the major communication 
failures, 65 per cent were due to communication problems between operating sub-teams: between the 
surgical and radiology teams (38 per cent); between the surgical and the anaesthetic teams (23 per 
cent); between other team members including the nursing team (4 per cent).  Of the remaining major 
failures, 17 per cent were technical failures, 13 per cent were equipment-related failures, 7 per cent 
   
were safety awareness failures (such as checks not done) and 5 per cent were procedure-independent 
pressures.  
 Most major failures (83 per cent) led to significant intraoperative delay.  Fourteen major 
failures directly caused harm. Among the 17 per cent of failures that posed significant risk of harm 
without any associated delays, communication failures were the most common.  Of the 14 major 
failures that led directly to intraoperative harm in 12 patients (6.5 per cent of study cohort), 
communication failures were reported by the team to have led to half of these harm-producing events 
(Table 2).  There were four technical errors that harmed patients directly.  Three events related to 
unanticipated difficulties with the patient’s anatomy.  Although not a primary aim of the study, review 
of these failures indicated that additional factors, such as inexperience or a lack of vigilance, may also 
have played a role; harm was rarely the direct result of a single identifiable cause.   
+B: Determinants of failure 
Patient age, sex and ASA grade were not associated with increased failure rates in univariable 
analyses.  There were also no significant differences in failures rates between levels of experience for 
all professions in the operating team.  In multivariable regression, thoracic/arch aneurysms in 
comparison with other aortic pathologies (incidence rate ratio (IRR) 2.07, 95 per cent c.i. 1.39 to 3.08; 
P < 0.001) were significant predictors of increased failure rates.  Of note, two-thirds of patients with 
thoracic/arch aneurysms in this cohort underwent either carotid subclavian bypass and thoracic 
endovascular repair (TEVAR) or custom-made TEVAR.   
Unfamiliarity with equipment (IRR 1.52, 1.20 to 1.91; P < 0.001), and endovascular repair 
compared with open surgical approaches (IRR for open repair 0.71, 0.57 to 0.88; P = 0.002) were also 
significant predictors of failure.  For major failure, only unfamiliarity with equipment was 
significantly associated with an increased failure rate (IRR 2.59, 1.51 to 4.28; P = 0.001).  
+B: Association between intraoperative failures and patient outcomes 
Some 152 of 171 procedures were successful technically with no adverse events at 24 h after surgery 
(data missing for 14 procedures).  Thirteen patients required reoperation, 37 developed major 
complications, four had a prolonged hospital stay (over 30 days) and seven patients died.  The total 
number of intraoperative failures was significantly higher in procedures requiring an unplanned return 
   
to theatre: median 5 (i.q.r. 4–10) versus 3 (2–6) for procedures with no further operation (P = 0.037). 
The number of major intraoperative failures was also significantly higher in procedures subsequently 
requiring reoperation: median 1 (0–2.5) versus 0 (0–1) (P = 0.011).  Significantly greater numbers of 
major failures were reported during procedures after which the patient developed a major 
complication: median 0 (0–1.5) versus 0 (0–1) for procedures followed by minor or no complications 
(P =0.029).  Similarly, number of major errors was associated with death: median 1 (0–3) for 
procedures followed by death versus 0 (0–1) where the patient survived to discharge (P = 0.027) (Fig. 
3).  There were no differences in the number of intraoperative failures occurring during successful 
versus unsuccessful procedures (3 (2–6) versus 5 (2–6); P = 0.147) or between regular and prolonged 
(over 30 days) hospital stay (3 (2–6) versus 4 (3–5); P = 0.837).   
+A: Discussion 
This large study in vascular surgery demonstrates that many avoidable safety failures relate to aspects 
of the surgical system, in addition to patient factors and technical expertise.  This study links 
intraoperative safety failure with adverse outcomes in patients undergoing aortic surgery.  In line with 
a smaller study of safety failures in cardiac surgery7, the present work shows that many failures 
leading to patient harm stem from failures in the system.  Operating teams must recognize potential 
failures in the surgical system and endeavour to mitigate them.  
The National Reporting and Learning System (NRLS) is voluntary system for reporting 
adverse events and near misses that occur in healthcare.  As such, it relies on the details submitted by 
the reporter and is inherently under-representative of the volume of events that occur8. The benefits of 
NRLS, in the same way as the LEAP study, come from analysing the report to identify themes, which 
can be targeted for improvement.  A retrospective study of NRLS, aiming to identify the causes of 
patient harm in aortic surgery, demonstrated findings remarkably similar to those of the present study. 
There is a clear need to address communication and equipment-related failures.  A benefit of the 
ICECAP debriefing approach to identifying intraoperative failures is that it enables learning to take 
place locally, so that improvement measures can be implemented immediately. 
   
Intraoperative failures appear to have a significant effect on operating theatre efficiency, as 
well as patient safety.  Nearly two-thirds of errors caused intraoperative delays in procedural 
workflow, with more than 90 h lost over 185 procedures. Since the average cost of running an 
operating theatre exceeds £1200 per h (€1443 per h; exchange rate 28 June 2016)9, by avoiding these 
procedural delays the potential cost savings would be great for each institution.   
It has been demonstrated that error rates vary between operation types, with procedures 
relying on technology, such as those in vascular or cardiac surgery7, having the highest rates of total 
and equipment-related error.  The present study has expanded on the findings of previous single-
centre studies, demonstrating that endovascular procedures are consistently associated with more 
failures than open surgical operations. Although minimally invasive surgery has undoubtedly reduced 
surgical morbidity and mortality rates, to achieve optimal, safe and efficient outcomes avoidable error 
must be minimized.  The increased rates of error during endovascular versus open surgical procedures 
may be explained by the rapidly evolving nature of the endovascular field, more challenging 
technology and the increased number of new devices on the market, resulting in an extensive and 
changing learning curve. Thoracic/arch aortic aneurysms predicted higher failure rates than infrarenal 
or juxtarenal aortic procedures, which may be explained by their relative technical difficulty.   
In the present study, perceived unfamiliarity with equipment significantly predicted increased 
rates of intraoperative failures, whereas actual experience (in terms of the number of operations 
performed) did not.  Vascular operating teams are using an increasingly wide range of stent-graft 
devices in order to treat patients with a broad range of anatomical configurations, and the large 
number of devices being used is a factor contributing to unfavourable results10.  Operators planning to 
introduce a new interventional device have a responsibility to ensure that the introduction of new 
equipment is accompanied by adequate training, and fulfils safety and financial regulations within 
their institution.  This may include gaining approval from the divisional board and new procedures 
committee, ensuring that protocols are in place, and ensuring there is a robust structure for audit and 
evaluation.  In reality, however, new devices and equipment are regularly introduced into the 
operating environment.  Currently, it is unclear who is ultimately responsible for training 
endovascular operators and their teams, whether industry or healthcare institutions, when new devices 
   
become available for use in patients.  New-device training requires attention to improve patient safety. 
Communication failures represented a significant proportion of major errors reported in the 
study, and contributed to half of all intraoperative harm events.  Complex aortic procedures demand 
precise communication and collaboration from increasingly large and multidisciplinary operating 
teams.  This study was undertaken in the UK, where, similar to many European institutions, surgeons 
and interventional radiologists commonly collaborate to perform endovascular procedures.  Dual 
consultant operating has also become routine practice.   Rotation of operating staff is commonplace 
and, as a result, team members may not work together regularly.  Consequently, effective leadership 
and teamwork are challenging in this high-risk environment, yet training in these essential non-
technical skills is not routine practice, despite the evidence of a relationship between teamwork and 
patient outcomes11. 
This study highlights the need to address human factor skills (such as communication, team-
working, leadership) and system factors (equipment planning, provision and maintenance, pressures 
on the operating team and their environment, provision of training) that may influence patient 
outcomes in aortic surgery, while continuing to optimize the patient’s preoperative condition and 
technical expertise among surgeons.  A substantial proportion of equipment failures were due to non-
availability, failure or configuration, suggesting that there are clear advantages to implementing 
protocols to reduce equipment-related error. Procedure-specific equipment checks could be 
incorporated into the WHO’s surgical safety checklist12, specially adapted for aortic repair.    
The provision of teamwork and leadership training for vascular operating teams is crucial to 
improve patient outcomes.  Team simulations have been shown to be a powerful tool for training and 
improving the technical and non-technical skills required to perform endovascular aortic aneurysm 
repair and complex cardiovascular procedures, and may be particularly useful for rehearsal of crisis 
scenarios13.   
A clear limitation of this study is self-reporting, which is likely to be influenced by cognitive 
biases, clinical processes (such as production pressure) and individual reporting styles14. To minimize 
the impact of this limitation, the ICECAP tool was used immediately after the procedure to structure 
   
postoperative team self-reporting of failures, which has been shown to reduce recall bias5.  Although 
independent observation is not susceptible to primacy and recency bias effects, and is an alternative to 
collecting data on intraoperative failures, it is relatively time-consuming and expensive, and may 
influence operating team behaviours (Hawthorne effect).  A further potential limitation of self-report 
is selective reporting.  As the aortic procedure log was completed poorly across participating sites, it 
is not clear whether consecutive patients were recruited into the study.  In an ideal study environment, 
consistent teams would have been necessary for data reporting. This study aimed to capture real-world 
intraoperative failures, so the fact that teams were inconsistent provided an honest report. Finally, the 
number of patients with adverse outcomes was small, so the assessment of between-group differences 
for failure and patient outcomes was not adjusted for multiple comparisons.  The association between 
intraoperative failures and patient outcomes should be part of future research programmes to further 
validate these findings. 
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Fig. 1 Profile of failures identified through prospective observation by the trainer and structured team 
self-reporting during the training phase 
Fig. 2 Causes of failure in 185 aortic procedures by primary category and subcategory 
Fig. 3 Association between major failures per procedure and patient outcomes: a unplanned return to 
the operating theatre, b postoperative complications and c in-hospital mortality.  Median values (bold 
line), i.q.r. (box) and 1.5 × i.q.r. (whiskers) are shown; outliers are represented by symbols. *P = 
0.011, †P = 0.029, ‡P = 0.027 (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, not adjusted for multiple comparisons)  
   
Table 1 Patient and procedure data in phase II 
 No. of patients 
(n = 185) 
Patient demographics  
Mean age (years)* 73(10) (37–100) 
Male sex 153 of 180 (85.0) 
ASA fitness grade 
I 2 of 179 (1.1) 
II 44 of 179 (24.6) 
III 119 of 179 (66.5) 
IV 14 of 179 (7.8) 
Primary aortic pathology 
Infrarenal abdominal AAA 111 of 182 (61.0) 
Juxtarenal abdominal AAA 30 of 182 (16.5) 
Thoracic/arch aortic aneurysm 8 of 182 (4.4) 
Thoracoabdominal aortic aneurysm 15 of 182 (8.2) 
Occlusive disease 9 of 182 (4.9) 
Other 9 of 182 (4.9) 
Procedures  
Open infrarenal AAA repair 21 (11.4) 
Open juxtarenal aortic aneurysm repair/type IV aortic aneurysm repair 9 (4.9) 
Open aortoiliac bypass 7 (3.8) 
Open aortofemoral bypass 7 (3.8) 
EVAR  – conventional 69 (37.3) 
EVAR  – additional complexity† 18 (9.7) 
Branched EVAR/fenestrated EVAR – conventional 23 (12.4) 
Fenestrated EVAR – additional complexity† 4 (2.2) 
Thoracic EVAR – conventional 8 (4.3) 
Thoracic EVAR – additional complexity† 7 (3.8) 
Visceral hybrid repair 2 (1.1) 
Other 10 (5.4) 
Values in parentheses are percentages unless indicated otherwise; *values are mean(s.d.) (range). 
†Endovascular procedure with additional intervention besides femoral cut down for arterial access. AAA, 
abdominal aortic aneurysm; EVAR, endovascular aneurysm repair. 
 
   
Table 2 Illustrative quotes from Imperial College error capture record records for major failure 
leading to harm 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EVAR, endovascular aneurysm repair; IIA, internal iliac artery. 
 
‘Misleading communication led to wrong clamps being taken off the graft…substantial blood loss, 
which was ‘hidden’ and went unnoticed leading to severe hypotension in a patient with significant 
co-morbidity’   (hybrid open visceral artery retrograde revascularizsation and endovascular 
thoracoabdominal aneurysm repair) 
 
‘Communication failure and discord between surgeons and scrub nurse during bleeding.  Scrub 
nurse unfamiliar with use of pledgeted sutures to repair internal iliac vein injury.  
Miscommunication led to a further tear in vein as sutures were pulled out.  Patient became acutely 
unstable’   (EVAR with surgical ligation of IIA) 
 
‘Wrong sized limb placed necessitating embolization of IIA’  (EVAR and left to right femorofemoral 
artery crossover graft) 
 
‘Wrong incision due to lack of communication between radiology and surgical teams’  (aortouni-
iliac and femorofemoral artery crossover graft) 
 
‘Lack of communication between surgeons and anaesthetist regarding degree of blood loss.  
Change of consultant anaesthetist mid-procedure – patient not transfused after initial 2 units.  
Miscommunication with blood transfusion laboratory – delay in receiving cross-matched blood for 
hypovolaemic patient’  (thoracic EVAR) 
 
